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A DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS OF THE IMPEACHMENT USE
OF SILENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
BARBARA ROOK SNYDER*
The constitutional and evidentiary problems presented by any
use of a defendant's silence in a criminal prosecution have plagued
the United States Supreme Court since 1926, when the Court held
in Raffel v. United States" that a prosecutor could impeach a de-
fendant who testified at his second trial with his failure to testify
at his first trial.2 Fifty years later, in Doyle v. Ohio,3 the Court
considered the constitutionality of the impeachment use of a de-
fendant's silence after he had received Miranda warnings4 and
concluded that the use of such silence was a deprivation of due
process.5 Then, in Jenkins v. Anderson,' the Court held that pre-
arrest silence could be used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory
testimony.7 Most recently, the Court decided in Fletcher v. Weir8
that post-arrest silence could be used for impeachment purposes
when it did not appear from the record that Miranda warnings
had been given.9
In these cases, the Supreme Court has failed to consider the ma-
jor constitutional impediment to the use of silence to impeach a
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. B.A., Ohio State Univer-
sity; J.D., University of Chicago. I would like to thank my colleagues Paul Giannelli, Lewis
Katz, and William Marshall for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I am especially
grateful to Paul Giannelli for the encouragement and guidance he provided, and for the
probing questions he asked as I worked through the ideas for this article. I also benefitted
greatly from the able research assistance provided by Jennifer Branch (class of '87), Mark
Botti (class of '85), Paul Corrado (class of '85), and Richard Street (class of '86). I want to
acknowledge particularly Jennifer Branch for the hard work and energy that she devoted to
helping me complete this article.
1. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
2. Id. at 499.
3. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
4. Id. at 611.
5. Id. at 618.
6. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
7. Id. at 238-40.
8. 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
9. Id. at 607.
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criminal defendant's testimony, and consequently it has not devel-
oped a theoretical approach properly adapted to the problem. The
absence of an appropriate analytical model creates difficulties for
defense lawyers advising defendants and planning pretrial and
trial strategy. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion
in Jenkins,
[A] person who thinks he may have done something wrong must
immediately decide, most likely without the assistance of coun-
sel, whether, if he is ever charged with an offense and brought to
trial, he may wish to take the stand. For if he may later want to
take the stand, he had better go to the police station right away
to preserve his exculpatory explanation of the events-even
though in so doing he must incriminate himself and provide evi-
dence which may be crucial to his eventual conviction. But if he
decides not to incriminate himself, he may anticipate that his
right to testify in his own defense will be undermined by the
argument that his story is probably untrue because he did not
volunteer it to the police at the earliest opportunity. All these
strategic decisions must be made before the individual even
knows if he will be charged and of what offense he will be
accused.10
In addition, the Court in Jenkins and Weir left the state courts
free to decide, as an evidentiary matter, whether silence in a par-
ticular case is sufficiently inconsistent with trial testimony to have
probative value.11 The state courts are also free, of course, to de-
cide whether the use of a criminal defendant's silence violates their
state constitutions. 12
This Article critically examines the varied analyses used by the
Supreme Court and state courts to determine the constitutionality
of the impeachment use of silence in criminal prosecutions. It then
presents an approach to the issue based on the due process analy-
sis first used by the Court in Doyle and improperly limited by the
decisions in Jenkins and Weir. This Article suggests that the use
of a defendant's pretrial silence to impeach his exculpatory testi-
10. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 253-54 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
12. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 609 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239
(1980).
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mony at tkial is "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process '13 without regard to whether the defendant received Mi-
randa warnings. Finally, the Article demonstrates how a due pro-
cess approach would resolve the cases in a principled, more consis-
tent, and straightforward manner.
I. THE PRIOR ANALYTICAL APPROACHES
A. Waiver Analysis
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the use of silence
to impeach a criminal defendant's testimony in Raffel v. United
States.14 The defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate the
Prohibition Act. He did not take the stand at his first trial, which
ended with a hung jury. At his first and second trials, a govern-
ment agent testified that, after a search of the premises, the de-
fendant admitted that the establishment belonged to him.' 5 The
defendant took the stand at his second trial and denied making the
statement. The judge questioned him about his failure to testify at
his first trial to rebut the agent's testimony. The defendant re-
sponded that he had not testified because he had not thought the
prosecution had presented enough evidence to convict him.1"
The defendant contended before the Supreme Court that the
questioning by the judge concerning his silence at his first trial vio-
lated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 7
The Court disagreed, reasoning that, once the defendant waived
the privilege by taking the stand, he could not reassert the privi-
lege as to his silence in the past.18 The Court assumed that if the
defendant had not testified at his second trial, evidence of his fail-
ure to testify at his first trial would have been inadmissible." Nev-
ertheless, the Court stated:
13. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
14. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
15. Id. at 495.
16. Id. In response to questions from his own lawyer, the defendant subsequently stated
that his decision not to testify at his first trial had been on the advice of counsel. Id. at 495
n.1.
17. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part: "No person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 496-97.
19. Id. at 497.
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When [the defendant] takes the stand in his own behalf, he does
so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate
rules he may be cross-examined as to the facts in issue. He may
be examined for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. His
failure to deny or explain evidence of incriminating circum-
stances of which he may have knowledge, may be the basis of
adverse inference, and the jury may be so instructed. His waiver
is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he
may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination may be
inconvenient or embarrassing.20
The Court concluded that allowing a defendant to be impeached
by his prior silence did not unconstitutionally burden the exercise
of his fifth amendment privilege because the decision to testify
would have been difficult in any event, and allowing impeachment
by prior silence did not create any significant additional pressure.2
The waiver analysis used in Raffel was reaffirmed fifty-four years
later in Jenkins v. Anderson.22 In Jenkins, the defendant, on trial
for first-degree murder, testified that the killing had been in self-
defense. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the
defendant about his actions following the killing, including the fact
that the defendant had waited two weeks to turn himself in to the
police. During closing argument, the prosecutor again referred to
the defendant's failure to report the incident.23 The defendant ar-
gued before the Supreme Court that the use of his pre-arrest si-
lence to impeach his trial testimony violated both his right to re-
main silent and the fundamental fairness guarantee implicit in due
process.24
In rejecting the defendant's argument based on the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court relied on Raffel. 25 Noting
that, as in Raffel, the defendant in Jenkins took the stand and
thus waived his right to remain silent,26 the Court reiterated that
"[t]he Raffel Court explicitly rejected the contention that the pos-
20. Id. at 497 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 499.
22. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
23. Id. at 232-34.
24. Id. at 235-38.
25. Id. at 235-37.
26. Id. at 236 n.2.
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sibility of impeachment by prior silence is an impermissible bur-
den upon the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights.127
The Court in Raffel did not base its "total waiver" theory on any
language in the fifth amendment, and none of the prior cases cited
by the Court compels or indeed even supports such a conclusion.
In Reagan v. United States,28 the defendant objected to the trial
court's instruction to the jury to consider carefully the weight to be
accorded to his testimony given his "deep personal interest" in the
outcome of the trial.29 The Court held that the instruction was
proper because, if a defendant chose to testify, "his credibility may
be impeached, his testimony may be assailed, and is to be weighed
as that of any other witness."30 In Fitzpatrick v. United States,31
the defendant challenged the prosecutor's questions on cross-ex-
amination concerning the details of his alibi. The Court held that
[w]here an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of
silence, takes the stand in his own behalf and makes his own
statement, it is clear that the prosecution has a right to cross-
examine him upon such statement with the same latitude as
would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness.2
The Court was not confronted, in either of these cases, with an
attempt by the prosecution to impeach a defendant's exculpatory
27. Id. at 236-37. The Court noted that "[in determining whether a constitutional right
has been burdened impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the
challenged governmental practice." Id. at 238. The Court then concluded that allowing im-
peachment of a defendant by his silence "advances the truth-finding function of the crimi-
nal trial" by allowing the prosecutor to test the credibility of the defendant's testimony, as
is done with any witness. Id.
28. 157 U.S. 301 (1895), cited in Raffel, 271 U.S. at 496-97.
29. The challenged instruction read:
You should especially look to the interest which the respective witnesses have
in the suit or in its result. Where the witness has a direct personal interest in
the result of the suit the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold
[sic] the facts. The law permits the defendant, at his own request, to testify in
his own behalf. The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. His
testimony is before you and you must determine how far it is credible. The
deep personal interest which he may have in the result of the suit should be
considered by the jury in weighing his evidence and in determining how far or
to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit.
Id. at 304 (quoting the jury instructions).
30. Id. at 305.
31. 178 U.S. 304 (1900), cited in Raffel, 271 U.S. at 496-97.
32. Id. at 315.
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trial testimony with his prior assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Indeed, the Court in Fitzpatrick explicitly recog-
nized that "no inference of guilt can be drawn from [a defendant's]
refusal to avail himself of the privilege of testifying."33 To hold
that a defendant who takes the stand thereby opens the door for
full cross-examination, which may include testing his credibility
with evidence of prior inconsistent statements, is quite different
from suggesting that a defendant who chooses to testify may be
impeached by his earlier assertion of a right guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Of the cases cited in Raffel,3 4 Caminetti v. United States3 5 was
most on point. Referring to the defendant's testimony about de-
tails leading up to the incident in question and his subsequent fail-
ure to testify further, the trial judge in Caminetti instructed the
jury:
[Tihis was the defendant's privilege, and, being a defendant, he
could not be required to say more if he did not desire to do so;
nor could he be cross-examined as to matters not covered by his
direct testimony. But in passing upon the evidence in the case
for the purpose of finding the facts you have a right to take this
omission of the defendant into consideration. A defendant ...
cannot be compelled to testify at all, and if he fails to do so no
inference unfavorable to him may be drawn from that fact, nor
is the prosecution permitted in that case to comment unfavora-
bly upon the defendant's silence; but where a defendant elects
to go upon the witness-stand and testify, he then subjects him-
self to the same rule as that applying to any other witness, and
if he has failed to deny or explain acts of an incriminating na-
ture that the evidence of the prosecution tends to establish
against him, such failure may not only be commented upon, but
may be considered by the jury with all the other circumstances
in reaching their conclusion as to his guilt or innocence; since it
is a legitimate inference that, could he have truthfully denied or
33. Id. The Court in Reagan made a similar statement based on a federal statute that
provided that the defendant's failure to testify "shall not create any presumption[s] against
him." Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305 (1895) (quoting 20 Stat. 30, ch. 37 (1878)).
This protection has since been held to be one of constitutional dimension. See Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); see also infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
34. 271 U.S. at 496-97.
35. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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explained the incriminating evidence against him, he would have
done so. 36
The Court concluded that the instruction did not violate the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen
[the defendant] took the witness stand in his own behalf he volun-
tarily relinquished his privilege of silence," and therefore "he may
not stop short in his testimony by omitting and failing to explain
incriminating circumstances and events already in evidence, in
which he participated and concerning which he is fully informed,
without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be naturally
drawn from it."137
The facts of Caminetti are clearly distinguishable from those in
Raffel. In Caminetti, the defendant's silence at trial was only par-
tial, and the jury was permitted to draw a negative inference from
the defendant's testimony as to selected parts of the incident in
question.38 One could easily conclude that a defendant who chooses
to testify waives his privilege against self-incrimination as to that
stage of the criminal process. That proposition, however, does not
support the position taken by the Court in Raffel that a defend-
ant's waiver of the privilege at trial operates retroactively as a
waiver of the privilege as to earlier stages.3 9
Further, the waiver analysis of Raffel and Jenkins is a flawed
approach to the problem. In both cases, the Court failed to explain
why a waiver of the defendant's privilege at the time of trial also
acted as a waiver of his prior assertions of the privilege.40 As Pro-
fessor Saltzburg recognized,
36. Id. at 493 (quoting the jury instruction).
37. Id. at 494.
38. Cf. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam) (distinguishing between the
defendant who does not speak at all, as in Doyle, and the defendant who speaks but does
not "tell all").
39. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 499.
40. The Court in Doyle noted, however:
It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be
used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpa-
tory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon
arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach
the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to
his behavior following arrest.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 n.11 (1976).
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A holding that allows the Government to use a person's invoca-
tion of the privilege at a subsequent stage [of the criminal pro-
cess] invites prosecutors to call defendants at preliminary hear-
ings and before grand juries in order to ask questions that the
suspect either must answer and risk incrimination or refuse to
answer and risk incrimination by impeachment.4'
He concluded that Jenkins (and presumably Raffel) was incor-
rectly decided because "the Jenkins holding permits the govern-
ment to compel incrimination at several different stages of a crimi-
nal case."42
Finally, the fifth amendment itself seems inconsistent with the
waiver analysis used by the Court in Raffel and Jenkins. "At every
stage of the investigative or accusatory process, a person must de-
cide what, if anything, to say to the government."4 In many cases,
a defendant will have little incentive to make any statement to the
government until he knows something about the government's case
against him, which would be after indictment and discovery. In-
deed, the privilege against self-incrimination permits a defendant
to remain silent both before and during trial." In Murphy v. Wa-
terfront Commission,45 the Court explicitly recognized that one of
the values underlying the privilege against self-incrimination is
"our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual bal-
ance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone un-
til good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the en-
tire load.' ,6 The Court reiterated that policy in Miranda v. Ari-
41. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the
Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 204 (1980). See also Poulin, Evidentiary Use
of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 191, 234 (1984) (reaching the same conclusion, although without reference to
Saltzburg's article); Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger
Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 422 (1977) (asserting that "a defendant who testi-
fies at trial does not retroactively waive his prior reliance on the privilege").
42. Saltzburg, supra note 41, at 205.
43. Id. at 204.
44. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614-15 (1965).
45. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
46. Id. at 55 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 317 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
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zona47 and went on to state that "our accusatory system of crimi-
nal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own indepen-
dent labors. '48 The privilege against self-incrimination thus con-
templates an adversarial system in which a defendant need make
no statement to the government before trial. How incongruous,
then, to suggest that, in such a system, a defendant who testifies at
his trial waives his prior assertions of the privilege and leaves him-
self open to questions and comment about his pre-trial silence.
The waiver analysis thus is not supported either by precedent or
by the fifth amendment itself.
B. Evidentiary Analysis
The Supreme Court first used an evidentiary approach in Gru-
newald v. United States,49 in which the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to defraud the United States by using bribes to
"fix" tax cases and attempting to influence grand jury witnesses."0
When the defendant testified before the grand jury, he refused to
answer any questions on the ground that the answers might tend
to incriminate him; he insisted that he was innocent and asserted
his privilege on the advice of counsel. When the defendant testified
at his trial, the district court, relying on Raffel, allowed the prose-
cution to question him about his assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination before the grand jury.51 The trial court did, how-
ever, instruct the jury that the claim of privilege was not evidence
of guilt or innocence but could be used only as an indication of the
defendant's credibility.52
The Court held that the defendant's assertion of his constitu-
tional privilege before the grand jury was inadmissible for im-
peachment purposes because it was not inconsistent with his testi-
mony at trial." The Court explained:
47. 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
48. Id.
49. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
50. Id. at 393.
51. Id. at 416-17.
52. Id. at 417 & n.28.
53. Id. at 422. The Court considered three factors in determining that the defendant's
assertion of the privilege was not inconsistent with his exculpatory testimony at trial. First,
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We are not unmindful that the question whether a prior state-
ment is sufficiently inconsistent to be allowed to go to the jury
on the question of credibility is usually within the discretion of
the trial judge. But where such evidentiary matter has grave
constitutional overtones, as it does here, we feel justified in exer-
cising this Court's supervisory control to pass on such a ques-
tion. This is particularly so because in this case the dangers of
impermissible use of this evidence far outweighed whatever ad-
vantage the Government might have derived from it if properly
used.54
Relying on its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Court
held that the trial court had erred in allowing the prosecutor to
cross-examine the defendant regarding his prior assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination.5
The Court's treatment of Raffel in Grunewald is interesting. The
Court explicitly refused to re-examine its decision in Raffel,56 yet
attempted to distinguish it on the ground that "[t]he Court, in
Raffel, did not focus on the question whether the cross-examina-
tion there involved was in fact probative in impeaching the defend-
ant's credibility. '57 But the Court in Raffel purported to do just
that, stating that "we do not think the questions (about his earlier
failure to testify) asked of [the defendant] were irrelevant or
incompetent. ' '58
the defendant maintained his innocence before the grand jury and said that he claimed his
privilege only on advice of counsel. Second, the defendant was compelled to testify before
the grand jury and could not be represented by counsel, call witnesses, or cross-examine
witnesses. Third, in this case the defendant knew he was the likely target of the impending
indictment and might naturally have refused to provide any evidence that could later be
used to connect him with the.other defendants.
For many innocent men who know that they are about to be indicted will
refuse to help create a case against themselves under circumstances where lack
of counsel's assistance and lack of opportunity for cross-examination will pre-
vent them from bringing out the exculpatory circumstances in the context of
which superficially incriminating acts occurred.
Id. at 422-23.
54. Id. at 423-24. The Court noted that "the danger that the jury made impermissible use
of the testimony by implicitly equating the plea of the Fifth Amendment with guilt is, in
light of contemporary history, far from negligible." Id. at 424.
55. Id. at 424.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id. at 420.
58. 271 U.S. at 497-98.
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Although the Court did not resolve the constitutionality of the
questioning in Grunewald, it characterized the issue as having
"grave constitutional overtones."59 Four justices, however, in a sep-
arate concurring opinion written by Justice Black, would have
dealt with both questions. Those justices concluded that it was un-
constitutional to use the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege
against a defendant in any case and therefore that Raffel should
have been overruled.60
The second case in which the Court used the evidentiary ap-
proach to prohibit the use of a criminal defendant's silence to im-
peach his trial testimony was United States v. Hale.6 1 The police
arrested the defendant for robbery and advised him of his Mi-
randa rights. He then remained silent when questioned by the po-
lice. At trial, the defendant testified that his wife had given him
the money the police found in his possession, and that he was
somewhere else at the time of the robbery.6 2 On cross-examination,
the prosecutor asked the defendant why he had not told the police
about his alibi at the time of his arrest. The defendant responded
that he "'didn't feel that it was necessary at the time.' "63
The Government argued that according to Raffel, the question-
ing was appropriate because the defendant took the stand and
thereby waived his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court
disagreed, concluding that this case was more like Grunewald than
Raffel and that, under Grunewald, the defendant's silence could
For if the cross-examination had revealed that the real reason for the defend-
ant's failure to contradict the government's testimony on the first trial was a
lack of faith in the truth or probability of his own story, his answers would
have a bearing on his credibility and on the truth of his own testimony in
chief.
Id. at 498.
59. 353 U.S. at 423.
60. Id. at 425-26 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black stated,
[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be
penalized for relying on them. It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible
for courts which exist and act only under the Constitution to draw inferences
of lack of honesty from invocation of a privilege deemed worthy of enshrine-
ment in the Constitution.
Id.
61. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id.
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not be used to impeach his trial testimony. 4 The Court noted that,
in most situations, evidence of silence has very little probative
value. 5 After conceding that silence has more probative value
when it is natural under the circumstances to respond to a state-
ment, question, or accusation,66 the Court stated:
[T]he situation of an arrestee is very different, for he is under
no duty to speak and, as in this case, has ordinarily been advised
by government authorities only moments earlier that he has a
right to remain silent and that anything he does say can and will
be used against him in court.6
The failure of an arrestee to speak after he has been given Mi-
randa warnings "can as easily be taken to indicate reliance on the
right to remain silent as to support an inference that the explana-
tory testimony was a later fabrication."6 The Court concluded:
Not only is evidence of silence at the time of arrest generally
not very probative of a defendant's credibility, but it also has a
significant potential for prejudice. The danger is that the jury is
likely to assign much more weight to the defendant's previous
silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant to ex-
plain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the
strong negative inference that the jury is likely to draw from the
fact that the defendant remained silent at the time of his
arrest. 9
As in Grunewald, the Court relied on its supervisory power over
federal courts rather than deciding the constitutional issue, but
again the Court noted that the question presented had "'grave
constitutional overtones.' "
In both Grunewald and Hale, the Court held that the use of a
defendant's prior silence to impeach his exculpatory trial testi-
64. Id. at 175-76.
65. Id. at 176.
66. In fact, the Court in Hale characterized Raffel as such a case, noting that "[t]he Raf-
fel Court found that the circumstances of the earlier confrontation naturally called for a
reply" and therefore "held that evidence of the prior silence of the accused was admissible."
Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 180.
70. Id. at 180 n.7 (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 423).
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mony was error 1 and in both cases based its conclusion on princi-
ples of evidence law. The Court in both cases explicitly recognized
that, for reasons consistent with a defendant's innocence, he might
choose to say nothing.
At the time of arrest and during custodial interrogation, inno-
cent and guilty alike-perhaps particularly the innocent-may
find the situation so intimidating that they may choose to stand
mute. A variety of reasons may influence that decision. In these
often emotional and confusing circumstances, a suspect may not
have heard or fully understood the question, or may have felt
there was no need to reply. He may have maintained silence out
of fear or unwillingness to incriminate another. Or the arrestee
may simply react with *silence in response to the hostile and per-
haps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his detention.2
In both cases, the Court concluded that the probative value of the
defendant's silence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.7 3
The Supreme Court's analysis of the evidentiary value of silence
is inconsistent with principles of evidence law. That a defendant's
pre-trial silence could be explained as indicating consciousness of
guilt, fear of the criminal justice system, or reliance on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination does not mean that such silence
should be held inadmissible. As McCormick has noted, circumstan-
tial evidence
may look both ways, but it is for the adversary to argue its con-
trary bearing to the jury. All that is required for admission is
that the item offered, taken alone or in conjunction with other
evidence in the case, might suggest the inference proposed to a
71. Hale, 422 U.S. at 179-80; Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 423.
72. Hale, 422 U.S. at 177 (citations omitted). See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 422-23. The
Court has long recognized that a defendant's silence might lead to different inferences. In
the context of a defendant's failure to testify at trial, the Court in 1893 stated:
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely
innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when fac-
ing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character,
and offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to
such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is
not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the
witness stand.
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
73. Hale, 422 U.S. at 173, 180; Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 424.
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reasonable man, not that the judge must believe that the infer-
ence is more probable than not.74
The federal courts have consistently followed the principle that
evidence that may support either of two contrary inferences is ad-
missible. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has concluded:
The old notion that a jury should not be allowed to draw any
inference from circumstantial evidence, if the one [inference] is
as probable as the other, has fallen into discard and has been
replaced by the more sensible rule that it is the province of the
jury to resolve conflicting inferences from circumstantial
evidence.75
This view of relevance is codified in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.76 Even where there is concern about the potential for
prejudice as a result of the evidence, "it is generally better practice
to admit the evidence taking necessary precautions by way of con-
temporaneous instructions to the jury followed by additional ad-
monition in the charge. '1 7
A useful analogy can be made to cases involving the admissibil-
ity of evidence of the defendant's flight. As the courts have recog-
nized, "conflicting motives . . . may lead an innocent man to
flight. 178 The Supreme Court has stated that "it is a matter of
common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do some-
times fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being appre-
hended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as
witnesses. 7' Evidence of a defendant's flight, then, is similar to
evidence of a defendant's pre-trial silence in that varied and con-
flicting inferences, consistent with the defendant's guilt or inno-
74. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447, 458
(1938).
75. Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1969) (quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 1958)).
76. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
77. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 403[01], at 403-10 (1986).
78. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963) (quoting Alberty v. United
States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896)).
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cence, could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Because both
types of evidence have been characterized as entailing "the danger
of prejudice,"' 0 the courts have used limiting instructions in an at-
tempt to alleviate any prejudice.8 1
In the cases involving flight, however, "the universally accepted
rule [is] that evidence of flight is admissible to prove a conscious-
ness of guilt. '82 The defendant may, of course, attempt to rebut
the negative inference that might be drawn by presenting other ev-
idence tending to show a reason for his flight that is consistent
with his innocence. 3 The separate question about "[t]he probative
value, if any, of the evidence of flight will depend upon all the facts
and circumstances in evidence in the case and is a question of fact
for the jury. '84
80. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1977), appeal after remand, 572
F.2d 506 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978). See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.
171, 180 (1975); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957).
81. The trial court in Grunewald instructed the jury that the evidence of the defendant's
prior silence could be considered "only for the purpose of ascertaining the weight you
choose to give to his present testimony" and not as "a determination of the [defendant's]
guilt or innocence." 353 U.S. at 417-18 n.28. In Hale, the trial court told the jury immedi-
ately after the defendant had been questioned about his silence that they should disregard
the exchange, but the court of appeals "held that the error was not cured by this instruc-
tion." The issue was not raised before the Supreme Court. 422 U.S. at 175 n.3. In cases
involving flight, the trial judges in their charges to the jury generally "explain[] the conflict-
ing motives that may lead an innocent man to flight, and highlight[] the danger of drawing
an adverse inference from such evidence." United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 384
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Accord United States v. Stewart, 579 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir.) ("the limiting
instruction [on flight] given by the trial judge [was] proper"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936
(1978); United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 691 (6th Cir.) ("the District Court's instruc-
tion served to explain the pitfalls of placing excessive reliance on flight as evidence of
guilt"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 949 (1975).
82. United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1970). Accord Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492, 499 (1896) ("the law is entirely well settled that the flight of the ac-
cused is competent evidence against him"); United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 691 (6th
Cir.) (flight evidence "was relevant and admissible"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 949 (1975);
United States v. Greiser, 502 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1974); Shorter v. United States, 412
F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir.) ("evidence of flight.., is admissible"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970
(1969); 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 276, at 122 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) ("It is
universally conceded today that the fact of an accused's flight... [is] admissible as evidence
of consciousness of guilt").
83. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 82, § 276, at 130.
84. Shorter, 412 F.2d at 430. Accord Rowan, 518 F.2d at 691 ("it was for the jury to
decide what weight should be attached" to the defendant's flight).
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Application of this analysis to the facts of Grunewald and Hale
would lead to a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the Su-
preme Court. Because conflicting inferences could reasonably be
drawn from the defendant's pre-trial silence, the evidence properly
could have been admitted. The defendant would then have had an
opportunity to explain his silence as reliance on the Miranda
warnings, reliance on the advice of counsel, the result of fear or
intimidation, or other reasons consistent with his exculpatory trial
testimony.
Further, the general principle followed by appellate courts re-
viewing a trial court's ruling on admissibility is that great defer-
ence is accorded to the trial judge, whose decision will not be over-
turned absent an abuse of discretion. s5 The Court in Hale
recognized "that the question whether evidence is sufficiently in-
consistent to be sent to the jury on the issue of credibility is ordi-
narily in the discretion of the trial court."8 6 The Court nevertheless
overrode the trial judge's discretion on the ground that, in this
case, the "evidentiary matter has grave constitutional overtones. ' s7
This concern for constitutional implications exposes the most
important flaw in the evidentiary approach to the propriety of the
impeachment use of silence in criminal trials. The Court in Grune-
wald and Hale concluded that evidence of silence was inadmissible
not, as the Court stated, because of principles of evidence law, but
on constitutional grounds. As noted previously, the Court in both
cases held that the probative value of the evidence of silence was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.88 What was the "intolerably
prejudicial impact"8 " that the Court feared would result from the
prosecutor's questions about the defendant's pre-trial silence? The
Court in Hale said only, "The danger is that the jury is likely to
assign much more weight to the defendant's previous silence than
is warranted." 90 The Court in Grunewald was more explicit: "Too
many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege
85. This was true before as well as after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 77, 1 403[02], at 403-22 to 403-24.
86. 422 U.S. at 180 n.7.
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 69, 73.
89. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180.
90. Id.
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[against self-incrimination] as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too
readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime
or commit perjury in claiming the privilege." 91 According to the
Supreme Court, then, "the jury is likely to draw [a] "strong nega-
tive inference . . . from the fact that the defendant remained si-
lent. '9 2 The evidentiary analysis is thus a constitutional analysis in
disguise.93
The inevitable result of an evidentiary approach to the impeach-
ment use of silence in criminal trials is that state courts apply their
own rules of evidence; some admit the defendant's pre-trial silence
and others do not. 4 If, however, the results in Grunewald and
Hale were in reality based on the Constitution, then despite the
Supreme Court's assertions to the contrary, 5 states should not be
free to choose whether to admit evidence of a defendant's pre-trial
silence under their own rules of evidence.
C. Penalty for the Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
In Griffin v. California," the defendant, who was charged with
first degree murder, did not testify at his trial.97 The prosecutor
91. 353 U.S. at 421 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956)).
92. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180.
93. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the close relationship between evidentiary
and constitutional analyses in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), see infra text ac-
companying notes 96-100. In that case, the Court held that prosecutorial comment on the
defendant's failure to take the witness stand was unconstitutional. The state practice of
allowing such comment was, according to the Court,
in substance a rule of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tendering
to the jury for its consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal
offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment and
the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its
acceptance.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613.
94. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546, 559, 231 S.E.2d 618, 626-27 (1977)
("the evidence of defendant's silence ... at the scene of the crime was properly admitted in
evidence for the purpose of impeaching defendant").
95. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) ("[e]ach jurisdiction remains free to
formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more proba-
tive than prejudicial").
96. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
97. The defendant did, however, testify at his separate trial on the question of sentencing.
Id. at 609.
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commented on the defendant's failure to testify, stating that the
defendant "has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain,"
and that the victim "is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story
[and] [t]he defendant won't." 98 In addition, the trial judge in-
structed the jury:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts
within his knowledge, if he does not testify or ... fails to deny
or dxplain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into
consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence."
The Court in Griffin held that such comments violated the self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment because they consti-
tuted "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. [They] cut[] down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly."'10
Professor Stone has argued persuasively that the Griffin ap-
proach should apply to cases involving impeachment use of a de-
fendant's pre-trial silence.' 0 ' Under his analysis, "this [impeach-
ment] use of the defendant's silence constitutes an impermissible
penalty on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion."'1 2 The New York Court of Appeals used similar reasoning as
an alternative ground for reversing a conviction in People v. Cony-
ers.103 Indeed, the defendants in Doyle made this penalty argu-
ment and cited Griffin in their petition for certiorari 0 4 and their
brief before the Supreme Court. 05 Nevertheless, the Court did not
98. Id. at 611.
99. Id. at 610 (quoting the trial judge's instruction to the jury).
100. Id. at 614.
101. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 146 n.241.
Accord Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Si-
lence, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 940, 944 n.16 (1975).
102. Stone, supra note 101, at 146.
103. 49 N.Y.2d 174, 181 n.2, 400 N.E.2d 342, 347 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 407 n.2, vacated,
449 U.S. 809 (1980).
104. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (Nos. 75-
5014 & 75-5015).
105. Brief for the Petitioners at 26, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (Nos. 75-5014 &
75-5015) ("the prosecution may not impermissibly burden, or otherwise penalize, one for
having exercised either [the right to counsel or the right to remain silent]").
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even mention Griffin in its opinion in Doyle,106 although the Court
did state that "the error we perceive lies in the cross-examination
on this question, thereby implying an inconsistency that the jury
might construe as evidence of guilt.' 10 7 This may be the prejudicial
effect that the Court feared in Grunewald and Hale.0 s
As Professor Stone acknowledged, however, "the Court in recent
years has taken an increasingly dim view of the penalty doc-
trine."'10 9 Since that statement in 1977, the Court has explicitly re-
jected the application of the penalty approach of Griffin, at least in
the context of a case involving the impeachment use of pre-arrest
silence. In Jenkins v. Anderson,110 the Court reaffirmed its rejec-
tion in Raffel of "the contention that the possibility of impeach-
ment by prior silence is an impermissible burden upon the exercise
of Fifth Amendment rights.""' The Court in Jenkins noted that
impeaching a defendant's testimony with his pre-trial silence
would serve the truth-seeking function of the courts because it "al-
lows prosecutors to test the credibility of witnesses by asking them
to explain prior inconsistent statements and acts.""' 2
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented in Jen-
kins, contending that the use of Jenkins's silence to impeach his
trial testimony violated his privilege against self-incrimination by
penalizing him for exercising that right.11 Attacking the Court's
reliance on Raffel, Justice Marshall asserted that Raffel in practi-
cal effect had been overruled by Griffin v. California.1 4 Justice
Marshall's major objection was that admitting silence into evi-
dence for impeachment purposes in a case like Jenkins in effect
created a duty for a person to report his own crime before being
106. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, noted the defendants' reliance on Griffin
but stated that "as long ago as Raffel v. United States, this Court recognized the distinction
between the prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior silence and the use of
prior silence for impeachment purposes." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
107. 426 U.S. at 619 n.10.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 69.
109. Stone, supra note 101, at 146-47.
110. 447 U.S. 231 (1980); see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
111. 447 U.S. at 237.
112. Id. at 238.
113. Id. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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charged or even questioned by the police. Such a duty would be
tantamount to compelling that person to incriminate himself.."5
In Harris v. New York," 6 the Court used reasoning similar to
that in Jenkins to conclude that the impeachment use of a defend-
ant's statement taken by the police in violation of Miranda did not
violate the Constitution.1 7 The Court stated that, although the de-
fendant could decide not to testify, "[h] aving voluntarily taken the
stand, [he] was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accu-
rately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the tradi-
tional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.""' 8
Another problem with application of the Griffin approach to im-
peachment use of a defendant's pre-trial silence is that in Griffin,
the defendant's silence was used in the state's case in chief,
whereas in the situation under consideration, the evidence of si-
lence is used only to impeach the defendant's trial testimony." 9
Limiting the use of the defendant's pre-trial silence to impeach-
ment arguably imposes a lesser burden on the exercise of the privi-
115. 447 U.S. at 250 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
117. The prosecutor conceded that the defendant's statement was inadmissible in its case
in chief because of Miranda. Id. at 223-24.
118. Id. at 225. The New York Court of Appeals in Conyers believed that the Harris
rationale did not apply to silence for several reasons.
First, an inconsistent statement is much more probative than is silence. More-
over, a defendant's decision to remain silent at the time of arrest is in and of
itself an assertion of a basic constitutional privilege. Thus, to allow that silence
to be used against a defendant is to place a burden upon the direct exercise of
a fundamental right. The Miranda warnings, on the other hand, constitute a
prophylactic device designed to prevent constitutional violations and to protect
the rights of an accused. In the absence of any actual coercion, a statement
made by a defendant who has not been informed of his rights is not inherently
suspect, nor does the use of such a statement against a defendant penalize that
defendant for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. Since the use
for impeachment purposes of a statement made in the absence of Miranda
warnings does not penalize an accused for the assertion of a constitutional
right, whereas the use of a defendant's silence even for impeachment purposes
only would burden the exercise of the defendant's privilege against self incrim-
ination, it is appropriate to allow the use of such statements for impeachment
purposes while precluding similar use of a defendant's silence.
People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 182-83, 400 N.E.2d 342, 348, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 408, va-
cated, 449 U.S. 809 (1980).
119. See Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d at 181, 400 N.E.2d at 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
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lege against self-incrimination than does the use of the defendant's
silence as evidence of guilt in the government's case.120
Moreover, the defendant in situations such as those presented in
Raffel, Hale, or Jenkins can avoid the penalty simply by declining
to testify; the evidence of prior silence will not be admissible be-
cause the defendants will have offered no testimony to impeach.12
The real penalty, then, is not on the exercise of the privilege
against self-incrimination but instead on the defendant's decision
to testify.'22
The Supreme Court recently made explicit 123 that a criminal de-
fendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf.124
The Court has not concluded, however, that burdens imposed by
state procedures on the right to testify are unconstitutional. In
Harris v. New York,'25 the Court allowed a prosecutor to impeach
a defendant with a prior inconsistent statement taken in violation
of Miranda.28 The practice upheld in Harris certainly burdens the
exercise of the right to testify, because if the defendant does de-
cide to testify, his prior statement, which otherwise would be inad-
missible, may be used to impeach him. And in Crampton v.
Ohio,2 the Court upheld a state law requiring one trial, even in
capital cases, for determination of guilt and punishment. The de-
fendant in Crampton wanted to testify on issues related to punish-
ment without having that testimony used to determine the issues
120. See id. But see Stone, supra note 101, at 147 n.241 (arguing that the "penalty" for
the exercise of the privilege in the Doyle situation is greater than the penalty found by the
Court in Griffin because "the jury will always be aware of defendant's silence at trial, even if
no instruction is given" or comment made, whereas "[uln the Doyle situation .... the jury
will know nothing of the defendant's prior decision to remain silent unless it is expressly
brought to its attention").
121. See Stone, supra note 101, at 146 n.241.
122. See Poulin, supra note 41, at 213.
123. Previously, the Court had assumed without deciding that such a right existed. See
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
124. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2708 (1987). The Court found that the right to
testify is rooted in three constitutional provisions: the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment, and the privilege
against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment. Id. at 2709-10.
125. 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
126. 401 U.S. at 226.
127. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (decided with McGautha v. California), vacated, 408 U.S. 941
(1972).
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related to guilt. Although the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is un-
deniably hard to require a defendant on trial for his life and desir-
ous of testifying on the issue of punishment to make nice calcula-
tions of the effect of his testimony on the jury's determination of
guilt,'1 l 8 it did not find that the defendant's right to testify had
been unconstitutionally burdened. The Court stated that "it is not
thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of crimi-
nal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in
deciding whether to testify."' 12 9  The Court in Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe'30 stated that "the Constitution [does not] forbid[]
every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has
the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.' 131
The penalty imposed on the defendant's "right" to testify by the
impeachment use of his pre-trial silence seems no more severe than
those upheld in prior cases. In fact, the burden on the right to tes-
tify in a case like Jenkins or Doyle may be less severe than the one
involved in Harris because impeachment by a prior inconsistent
statement could be more damaging to a defendant's case than im-
peachment by silence,3 2 which could be easier to explain away.133
The Court's narrow construction of the penalty doctrine as ap-
plied to the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
may be explained in significant part by two factors: the historical
basis for the privilege and the vague policy justifications offered by
courts and legal scholars to justify the privilege. The "right"
against self-incrimination, as Professor Levy called it, 34 developed
128. Id. at 214.
129. Id. at 215. The defendant, in deciding "whether to waive the privilege [is expected
to] take into account the matters which may be brought out on cross-examination." Id.
130. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
131. Id. at 30. The defendant in Chaffin had received a more severe sentence after his
second trial than after his first trial. He argued that upholding this result would discourage
defendants from exercising their rights to appeal or collaterally attack convictions. Id. at 29.
132. Cf. People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 182, 400 N.E.2d 342, 348, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402,
408 ("an inconsistent statement is much more probative than is silence"), vacated, 449 U.S.
809 (1980).
133. See supra text accompanying note 72; infra text accompanying note 182; infra note
284.
134. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT viii (1968). Professor Levy explains:
Although the legal profession customarily refers to the right against self-in-
crimination as a "privilege," I call it a "right" because it is one. Privileges are
concessions granted by the government to its subjects and may be revoked. "In
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in England as part of the common law.1"' Some of the American
colonies enacted limited protection against self-incrimination.3 6
According to Professor Levy,
As the seventeenth century closed,... [t]here were several colo-
nies... in which [the privilege] appears to have been unknown
or, to be more accurate, nothing about its existence can be de-
termined from legislative or judicial records. In other colonies,
... the right was known by some defendants but received une-
qual respect from the authorities. . . Elsewhere the laws or
the United States," however, as James Madison observed, "the people, not the
government, possess the absolute sovereignty .... Hence the great and essen-
tial rights of the people are secured ... not by laws paramount to prerogative,
but by constitutions paramount to laws."
Id. at vii.
135. Id. It was known by the Latin maxim Nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum, which meant
that "[n]o one should be required to accuse himself." E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TODAY 2 (1955).
136. For example, Liberty 45 in the Body of Liberties adopted in 1641 in Massachusetts
provided:
"No man shall be forced by Torture to confesse any Crime against himselfe nor
any other unless it be in some Capitall case where he is first fullie convicted by
cleare and suffitient evidence to be guilty, After which if the cause be of that
nature, That it is very apparent there be other conspiratours, or confederates
with him, Then he may be tortured, yet not with such Tortures as be Barba-
rous and inhumane."
L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 345 (quoting WHITMORE, COL. LAWS OF MASS. 32-61). Professor
Levy states,
Clearly Liberty 45 was intended to restrict the use of torture, but just as
clearly the purpose of the restriction was to establish, at least partially, a right
against self-incrimination, for it completely abolished torture to force a confes-
sion of one's guilt.... Yet it most certainly did not recognize a right to remain
silent before an incriminating question in a public trial, when the defendant
had been duly accused.
Id.
In 1650, Connecticut adopted the following provision: "It is ordered by the authority of
this court that no man shall be forced by torture to confess any crime against himself."
LAWS OF CONN. COLONY 65 (1665 ed.), quoted in Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 779
(1935). See also L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 355 ("Although no one could be physically
forced to testify against himself,... Connecticut did not prohibit incriminating questions
nor bullying the prisoner"). Virginia enacted a similar protection in 1677: "[N]oe law can
compell a man to sweare against himself in any matter wherein he is lyable to corporal
punishment." II W. HENNING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 442 (1809-23), quoted in Pittman, supra, at 781 and L. LEVY, supra note 134, at
358.
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courts recognized the right but it was inconsistently observed
[and] sometimes grossly breached .... "I
Around the time of the Declaration of Independence, some
states incorporated a privilege against self-incrimination in their
constitutions.13 For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
adopted on June 22, 1776, stated that no man "can . . . be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself.' l3 9 Professor Levy observes
that "[r]ead literally and in context, it seemed to apply only to a
criminal defendant . . . at trial." 40 This provision "became a
model for other states and for the United States Bill of Rights."''
The privilege against self-incrimination was proposed in Con-
gress by James Madison. In its original form, it read: "No person..
. shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."' 42 The provi-
sion was amended on the floor of the House to apply only to crimi-
nal cases, 43 and the amended version was approved by the
Senate.""
Scholars examining the historical development of the privilege
do not agree about its significance. Professor McCormick states
that "[t]he . . . privilege goes far beyond the evils from which the
privilege sprang.' 1 45 Dean Pound thought that "the raison d'etre
137. L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 367. The scholars do not agree about the degree of recog-
nition accorded to the privilege in the colonies. See 8 J. WIGMORE. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
2250 n.1, at 269 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); Pittman, supra note 136, at 775.
138. L. Levy, supra note 134, at 405.
139. VII F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3813 (1909), quoted in L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 406.
140. L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 407.
141. Id. at 409. According to Levy, "the Virginia Declaration of Rights became one of the
most influential constitutional documents in our history.... [E]ight [states] protected the
right against self-incrimination ... in essentially the language of Virginia's Section 8." Id.
142. Speech of James Madison to Congress (June 8, 1789), I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434
(1789), quoted in L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 422.
143. Id. at 424-25.
144. Id. at 426.
145. McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 218, 222 (1956). He
described the historical reasons that led to the development of the privilege:
The evils which accompanied the particular process of interrogation of sus-
pects practiced by the Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber, the
targets of attack, were the evils of the fishing expedition, the inquisition of the
suspect about all of his past life without any previous charge being laid against
him, and the barbarous evil of torture. The old maxim, no man shall be com-
pelled to accuse himself, which the antagonists of the Star Chamber and High
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of [the immunity of a defendant from comment on his failure to
testify] ceased to have any basis in the seventeenth century." '146 On
the other hand, Professor Levy concludes that "[t]he previous his-
tory of the right, both in England and America, proves that it was
not bound by rigid definition. ' 14 7 Justice Frankfurter asserted that
"the history of the privilege establishes ... that it is not to be
interpreted literally." 4 Others believe that even if history sup-
ports a narrow construction of the privilege, a broad construction
is justified on the ground that "the 'noble principle' of the privilege
'transcends its origins.' ,,149
The disagreements concerning the historical development of the
privilege are minor compared to the disagreements concerning the
policies underlying the privilege. Professor McNaughton's revision
of Wigmore's treatise on evidence identified twelve policies ad-
vanced by various courts and commentators. 50 Several scholars
have noted the lack of consensus regarding the policies underlying
Commission seized upon, meant to them merely that no man should be com-
pelled to be his first accuser, that is, to answer without a charge.
Id. at 421.
146. Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1015 (1934).
147. L. LEVY, supra note 134, at 428. According to Professor Levy,
The framers of the Bill of Rights saw their injunction, that no man should
be a witness against himself in a criminal case, as a central feature of the accu-
satory system of criminal justice. While deeply committed to perpetuating a
system that minimized the possibilities of convicting the innocent, they were
not less concerned about the humanity that the fundamental law should show
even to the offender. Above all, the Fifth Amendment reflected their judgment
that in a free society, based on respect for the individual, the determination of
guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the accused made no unwilling
contribution to his conviction, was more important than punishing the guilty.
Id. at 432.
148. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
149. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 195 (quot-
ing United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
150. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 137, § 2251, at 297-317. The twelve on his list were:
(1) It protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself by a bad per-
formance on the witness stand.
(2) It avoids burdening the courts with false testimony.
(3) It encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the
fear that they might be compelled to incriminate themselves.
(4) The privilege is a recognition of the practical limits of governmental
power; truthful self-incriminating answers cannot be compelled, so why try.
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the privilege.151 As Dean McKay put it, "[d]espite much talk,
mostly slack-jawed, about the values enshrined in the privilege
against self-incrimination, it remains difficult even today (perhaps
especially today) to state the central policy that underlies the priv-
ilege.' 1 52 Even the Supreme Court noted, in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission,'5 3 that "the law and the lawyers... have never made
up their minds just what [the privilege] is supposed to do or just
whom it is intended to protect.' 1 54
(5) The privilege prevents procedures of the kinds used by the infamous
courts of Star Chamber, High Commission and Inquisition.
(6) It is justified by history, whose tests it has stood; the tradition which it
has created is a satisfactory one.
(7) The privilege preserves respect for the legal process by avoiding situa-
tions which are likely to degenerate into undignified, uncivilized and regretta-
ble scenes.
(8) It spurs the prosecutor to do a complete and competent independent
investigation.
(9) The privilege aids in the frustration of "bad laws" and "bad procedures,"
especially in the area of political and religious belief.
[(10)1 The privilege, together with the requirement of probable cause prior
to prosecution, protects the individual from being prosecuted for crimes of in-
sufficient notoriety or seriousness to be of real concern to society.
(11) The privilege prevents torture and other inhumane treatment of a
human being.
(12) The privilege contributes toward a fair state-individual balance by re-
quiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load.
Id.
151. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 137, § 2251, at 296 ("There is no agreement as to
the policy of the privilege against self-incrimination"); Berger, The Unprivileged Status of
the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 194 (1978) ("the policy functions
of the privilege have never been fully delineated or explained"); Schaefer, Police Interroga-
tion and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 506, 507 (1966) (analy-
sis of policy justifications for the privilege "remains a doctrine in search of a reason"); Schil-
ler, On the Jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment Right to Silence, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
197, 197 (1979) ("This controversy over the merits of the [privilege's] diverse policy justifi-
cations and over its proper scope and limits continues unabated").
152. McKay, supra note 149, at 193-194.
153. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
154. Id. at 56 n.5 (quoting Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and
Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 181, 182 (1953)). The Court in Murphy at-
tempted to articulate the policy justifications for the privilege.
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
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The failure of the Supreme Court to perceive a dominant policy
basis for the privilege may help explain the Court's reluctance to
apply the penalty analysis in that context. When the Court sees a
constitutional right as lacking a firm policy foundation, the Court
is less likely to be concerned about penalties that "cut[] down on
the [right] by making its assertion costly." 155 A narrow construc-
tion of the privilege is predictable when the Court finds no "cen-
tral policy" that would justify a broader interpretation. Indeed,
Justice Cardozo asserted in Palko v. Connecticut 56 that the privi-
lege is not an essential element of a fair criminal justice system.57
When viewed in this light, the Court's refusal to apply the penalty
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-indi-
vidual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," . . . our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual
"to a private enclave where he may lead a private life," . . . our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while some-
times "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2251, at 317 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)). The
passage quoted from Murphy has been referred to as a "laundry list of fragmentary justifi-
cations for the privilege." Berger, supra note 151, at 194.
155. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
156. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
157. Id. at 325-26. Justice Cardozo stated:
Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlight-
ened system of criminal justice would be impossible without ... immunity
from compulsory self incrimination.... Indeed, today as in the past there are
students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather
than a benefit, and who would limit its scope or destroy it altogether. No doubt
there would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or
mental. Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a
duty to respond to orderly inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
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analysis to the privilege outside the Griffin context 5 ' is
understandable. 159
D. Compelled Self-Incrimination
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its 1982 decision in State v.
Fencl,60 considered the constitutionality of using the defendant's
silence before he received Miranda warnings to impeach his trial
testimony. The court concluded that the impeachment use of pre-
arrest, pre-warning silence violated the privilege against self-in-
crimination. "If both a person's prearrest speech and silence may
be used against that person, . . [he] has no choice that will pre-
vent self-incrimination."' 6' If the defendant speaks, he may in-
criminate himself, and if he does not speak, his pre-Miranda si-
lence may be used as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach his
trial testimony. 6 2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court characterized the
defendant's choice as a "Catch-22" and treated it as compulsion. 63
The same analysis was used in a dissenting opinion in Adamson
v. California,' which involved a prosecutor's comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify at trial. 6 5 Justice Murphy stated that
such a practice
158. The Griffin context is the one to which the privilege clearly applies. "Since the right
to courtroom silence is the most basic feature of the privilege against self-incrimination, it is
deserving of unwavering protection by the Court." Berger, supra note 151, at 200.
159. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966), in which
the Court held that the Griffin rule prohibiting comment on a defendant's failure to testify
should not be applied retroactively.
160. 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982).
161. Id. at 237, 325 N.W.2d at 711.
162. As Professor Saltzburg described the problem, defendants may choose
either to turn themselves in and talk, in which case their confessions will be
used against them, or to remain silent, in which case testimony at trial will
lead to the silence being treated as testimony. Imposing this dilemma on sus-
pects compels them to speak, for no matter whether they talk or not, they will
be treated as having spoken.
Saltzburg, supra note 41, at 204.
163. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d at 237, 325 N.W.2d at 711.
164. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
165. That practice was subsequently held unconstitutional in Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 615 (1965), but under the theory that it constituted a penalty on the exercise of
the privilege against self-incrimination. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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compels a defendant to be a witness against himself in one of
two ways: ... If he does not take the stand, his silence is used as
the basis for drawing unfavorable inferences .... Thus he is
compelled, through his silence, to testify against himself.... If
he does take the stand,... he is necessarily compelled to testify
against himself.16 6
As the Supreme Court noted in Michigan v. Tucker,117 "[c]ases
which involve the Self-Incrimination Clause must, by definition,
involve an element of coercion, since the Clause provides only that
a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against him-
self."' 68 The analytical flaw in the approach suggested by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Fencl is that it incorrectly equates a gov-
ernment-imposed requirement that a defendant make a difficult
choice with governmental compulsion. The Supreme Court has al-
ways been careful to distinguish between those two situations.
In Williams v. Florida,'69 the Court considered the constitution-
ality of Florida's rule of criminal procedure requiring a defendant
who planned to present an alibi defense to notify the prosecutor
before trial. 70 Although the Court acknowledged that the defend-
ant had to choose "between complete silence and presenting a de-
fense," it concluded that the rule did not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination."' The Court reasoned that the defend-
ant was still free to decide whether to notify the prosecutor and
present an alibi defense or to say nothing before trial and not raise
alibi as a defense. According to the Court, the real pressure on the
defendant was caused by "the strength of the State's case," and
166. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Mur-
phy went on to state that the privilege against self-incrimination "is as applicable where the
compelled testimony is in the form of silence as where it is composed of oral statements."
Id. at 125.
167. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
168. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
169. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
170. Id. at 79.
That rule require[d] a defendant, on written demand of the prosecuting attor-
ney, to give notice in advance of trial if the defendant intend[ed] to claim an
alibi, and to furnish the prosecuting attorney with information as to the place
where he claim[ed] to have been and with the names and addresses of the alibi
witnesses he intend[ed] to use.
Id.
171. Id. at 84.
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"[r]esponse to that kind of pressure by offering evidence or testi-
mony is not compelled self-incrimination."' 2
The defendant in Crampton v. Ohio17 3 challenged the constitu-
tionality of Ohio's procedure for determining guilt and punishment
in a single trial, even in a capital case. He argued that the Ohio
procedure "unlawfully compels the defendant to become a witness
against himself on the issue of guilt by the threat of sentencing
him to death without having heard from him.' 17 4 As in Williams,
the Court recognized that under the state procedure at issue, the
defendant faced a difficult choice; nevertheless, the Court held that
the privilege against self-incrimination had not been violated by
putting the defendant to such a choice.
75
The case perhaps most closely analogous to that involving the
impeachment use of pre-trial silence is South Dakota v. Neville.
7 6
The state statute at issue in that case provided that a suspect's
refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test was admissible into evi-
172. Id. at 85. The Court also stated that
the notice-of-alibi rule by itself in no way affected [the defendant's] crucial
decision to call alibi witnesses or added to the legitimate pressures leading to
that course of action. At most, the rule only compelled [the defendant] to ac-
celerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date
information that the [defendant] from the beginning planned to divulge at
trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a mat-
ter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announc-
ing the nature of his defense ....
Id.
173. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (decided with McGautha v. California), vacated, 408 U.S. 941
(1972); see supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
174. 402 U.S. at 213.
175. The Court thought that the choice faced by the defendant in Crampton was no more
difficult than choices faced by defendants under state procedures that had already been
found by the Court to be constitutionally permissible.
It has long been held that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf
cannot then claim the privilege against cross-examination on matters reasona-
bly related to the subject matter of his direct examination. It is not thought
overly harsh in such situations to require that the determination whether to
waive the privilege take into account the matters which may be brought out on
cross-examination. It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes
the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or
the like. Again, it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administra-
tion of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in
deciding whether to testify.
Id. at 215 (citations omitted).
176. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
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dence in the suspect's subsequent trial for driving while intoxi-
cated.177 The defendant in that case had to decide whether to sub-
mit to the blood-alcohol test and thereby incriminate himself, or to
refuse and thereby incriminate himself. Again, as in Williams and
Crampton, the Court stated:
We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to
take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for
a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires sus-
pects and defendants to make difficult choices. We hold, there-
fore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police
officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the
officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. 178
The difference between Neville and a case involving impeach-
ment use of a defendant's pre-Miranda silence is that the defend-
ant in the latter situation must choose between two alternatives
that constitute incriminating testimony. The defendant may speak
and incriminate himself or he may remain silent, and that silence
may be used as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach his trial
testimony.17 e The defendant in Neville, on the other hand, was
faced with a choice between incriminating himself by testimonial
evidence if he refused to take the blood-alcohol test and incrimi-
nating himself by providing physical evidence if he submitted to
the test. Seventeen years before Neville, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant could be compelled to take a blood-alcohol test
because it provided nontestimonial evidence, which is not pro-
tected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 80
Despite this distinction between the two cases, the analogy is
still apt. In both situations, the defendant has to decide whether to
incriminate himself by one means or another; no matter which al-
ternative he' selects, the result will be evidence that can be used
against him later. Because the Court concluded that requiring the
defendant in Neville to make such a choice did not constitute com-
pulsion, forcing a defendant to choose between incriminating him-
177. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §32-23-10.1 (1984).
178. 459 U.S. at 564 (citations omitted).
179. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
180. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
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self by speaking or incriminating himself by remaining silent like-
wise is not compulsion. Indeed, the latter situation involves even
less coercion than did Neville, because the defendant in a Jenkins
type case can always avoid the incriminating effect of impeach-
ment by his prior silence by refusing to testify at his trial.181 Fur-
thermore, even if the defendant in a Jenkins type situation
chooses to take the witness stand, he can plausibly explain his
prior silence as reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination
or give some other reason consistent with his innocence. 182 Thus,
although the analysis based on compulsion is persuasive, the deci-
sion in Neville suggests that the Court will not find the impeach-
ment use of a defendant's pre-trial silence tantamount to com-
pelled self-incrimination.1 83
The Court's narrow construction of compulsion in cases like Wil-
liams, Crampton, and Neville is supported by the history of the
privilege, at least according to some commentators. Judge Friendly
concluded: "[I]t seems rather plain that what the framers meant
by compulsion were such things as brow-beating by a magistrate,
punishment for refusing to answer, the peine fort et dure for de-
clining to plead, and torture or threats to extract a confession."184
181. A decision not to testify, however, has its own set of negative consequences. First,
the defendant is, of course, relinquishing his "right" to testify. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court simply does not consider unconstitutional a re-
quirement that the defendant, in deciding whether or not to testify, "take into account the
matters which may be brought out on cross-examination." Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183,
215 (1971) (decided with McGautha v. California), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). Second,
when the defendant does not take the stand, "the jury will always be aware of defendant's
silence at trial, even if no instruction is given" or no comment is made by the prosecutor.
Stone, supra note 101, at 147 n.241. The jury then could still draw an adverse inference from
the defendant's failure to testify.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 72, 133.
183. One commentator described the Court's approach to compulsion as follows:
[T]he Court does recognize that there are some procedures which, if allowed to
stand, will impermissibly pressure a defendant to testify and will penalize the
nontestifying defendant's exercise of his right. The pressure to testify must be
significantly different from that inherent in the trial process, however, and the
Court will apparently weigh the jurisdiction's legitimate purpose for imposing
the procedure in determining whether it violates the privilege or due process.
Ritchie, supra note 41, at 430.
184. H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 272 (1967). Judge Friendly found the compulsion element
to be a central feature of the privilege.
What is important is that on any view the Fifth Amendment does not forbid
the taking of statements from a suspect; it forbids compelling them. That is
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R. Carter Pittman, the author of an important article tracing the
history of the privilege, stated that "[t]his privilege against self-
incrimination came up thru [sic] our colonial history as a privilege
against physical compulsion and against the moral compulsion that
an oath to a revengeful God commands of a pious soul."'' 8
Other scholars have suggested that a narrow interpretation of
compulsion is justified by policy. Professor McCormick thought
that the privilege should protect an accused from torture and in-
quisitorial procedure but not from having to answer questions:
[Q]rdinary morality... sees nothing wrong in asking a man, for
adequate reason, about particular misdeeds of which he has
been suspected and charged. Safeguards for official interrogation
are needed, of course. It should be supervised by an impartial
judge, who will confine it to relevant inquiries. The witness
should have the benefit of charges and of counsel, when appro-
priate. But to say he shall be free of questioning altogether
about his crimes goes too far. 88
what the words say, and history and policy unite to show that is what they
meant. Rather than being a "right of silence," the right, or better the privilege,
is against being compelled to speak. The distinction is not mere semantics; it
goes to the very core of the problem.
Id. at 271 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444) (emphasis in original).
185. Pittman, supra note 136, at 783.
186. McCormick, supra note 145, at 222. Dean Pound had previously suggested that type
of procedure:
I submit that there should be express provision for a legal examination of sus-
pected or accused persons before a magistrate; that those to be examined
should be allowed to have counsel present to safeguard their rights; that provi-
sion should be made for taking down the evidence so as to guarantee accuracy.
As things are, it is not the least of the abuses of the system of extra-legal
interrogation that there is a constant conflict of evidence as to what the ac-
cused said and as to the circumstances under which he said or was coerced into
saying it.
If such a legal examination were allowed, and provided for, there would be
no excuse for third-degree methods and it would be possible to deal with them
where they survived. Such a system also would, on the one hand, protect the
general run of accused persons in all legitimate interests much more effectively
than the present system and, on the other hand, in the case of malefactors who
now get the advantage of the immunity, would provide an effective method of
reaching the truth and heading off made-to-order defenses.
Pound, supra note 146, at 1017.
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A similar proposal to allow judicially supervised interrogation of a
suspect was endorsed by Justice Walter Schaefer"s" and Judge
Henry Friendly.8 s Justice Schaefer believed that "it is entirely un-
sound to exclude from consideration at trial the silence of a sus-
pect involved in circumstances reasonably calling for explanation,
or of a defendant who does not take the stand."'89 He therefore
concluded that it was "imperative that the privilege against self-
incrimination be modified to permit comment upon such si-
lence."' 90 Justice Schaefer would have required that a suspect be
advised prior to questioning "that he need not answer," but that if
he was later tried, "his failure to answer will be disclosed at his
trial."' 9' According to Justice Schaefer, that threat of disclosure of
pretrial silence would not constitute compulsion within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment.
Scholarly views of the history and policies of the privilege
against self-incrimination thus support the Court's restrictive in-
terpretation of the compulsion element. This construction of com-
pulsion certainly would permit the use of a defendant's pre-trial
silence to impeach his exculpatory testimony at trial.
E. Fundamental Fairness
In Doyle v. Ohio,92 the Court was confronted with the constitu-
tional questions it had avoided in Grunewald and Hale. Whereas
the earlier cases had involved federal prosecutions, Doyle was a
state case. Police arrested two defendants for allegedly selling ma-
rijuana to a government informant. At the time of their arrest,
they received Miranda warnings and said nothing. The defendants
were tried separately, but the evidence in both trials was virtually
187. Schaefer, supra note 151, at 518-21.
188. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 713 (1968).
189. Schaefer, supra note 151, at 520.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 520-21. Under Justice Schaefer's proposal, "[t]he only sanction upon a sus-
pect's refusal to respond to questioning before a judicial officer should be to permit the trier
of fact to consider that silence for whatever value it has in determining guilt or innocence."
Id. at 521. Accord Friendly, supra note 188, at 713. Judge Friendly would, however, leave
undisturbed the Griffin rule that "the court cannot comment on the defendant's failure to
take the stand at trial." Id. at 714.
192. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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identical.19 Each defendant testified that he had been framed by
the informant, and that in fact the informant had agreed to sell to
the defendants. On cross-examination, each defendant was asked
why he had not told this story to the police and narcotics agents at
the time of arrest. Neither defendant explained his silence as reli-
ance on the Miranda warnings. 194
The Court first reiterated its concern in Hale regarding the pro-
bative value of such silence. "Silence in the wake of these warnings
may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda
rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous be-
cause of what the State is required to advise the person ar-
rested."'195 The Court did not, however, rely on that conclusion to
decide the case. Rather, the Court reasoned:
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such cir-
cumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation
of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.' s
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, characterized the majority's ap-
proach as an "estoppel theory."'"e This approach required the
court to presume, if the defendant was advised of his rights and
then remained silent, that his silence indicated reliance on that ad-
vice and ultimately required the court to conclude that it would be
unfair to use his silence against him. 198 The flaw in the Court's
analysis, according to Justice Stevens, was that the two defendants
were not exercising their constitutional right to remain silent when
they failed to recount the frameup story to the arresting officers.
When asked to give reasons for their silence, the defendants did
not explain it as reliance in whole or part on that right.191 Because
these defendants were not relying on their privilege against self-
193. Id. at 611.
194. Id. at 614 & n.5.
195. Id. at 617.
196. Id. at 618.
197. Id. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 622.
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incrimination at the time of their arrest, Justice Stevens would
have held that using their silence for impeachment purposes was
not unfair.200 Indeed, Justice Stevens maintained that even if the
defendants had testified that they relied on their right to remain
silent, no constitutional impediment would have prevented them
from being questioned about that silence and being allowed to ex-
plain it as the assertion of their privilege.20 '
The Court in Jenkins v. Anderson2 0 2 rejected the fundamental
fairness analysis applied in Doyle because the Court found the
facts in the two cases distinguishable:
In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to re-
main silent before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before
the petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda warn-
ings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle
is not present in this case. 03
The Court in Jenkins thus made clear that the analysis in Doyle
was based on a type of "implicit assurance" theory.20 4
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Jenkins, wrote that
the reading of the Miranda warnings should not have been crucial
to the holding in Doyle because "[t]he furnishing of the Miranda
warnings does not create the right to remain silent; that right is
conferred by the Constitution. ' 20 5 He reasoned that, based on the
facts of Jenkins, the defendant's pre-arrest silence should not have
200. Id. at 622-24.
201. Id. at 626.
202. 447 U.S. 231 (1980); see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
203. 447 U.S. at 239-40. In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam), decided
six days after Jenkins, the Court made clear that Doyle would not apply when the defend-
ant spoke instead of remaining silent after receiving Miranda warnings. Id. at 408-09. In
Charles, the defendant told the police that he had stolen a car from a particular location,
but at trial he testified that he had stolen the car from a different location. The prosecutor
questioned the defendant about his prior inconsistent statement and asked why, if the new
story were true, the defendant had not told it to police after his arrest. The Court stated:
Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior in-
consistent statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence, be-
cause a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings
has not been induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his state-
ments, the defendant has not remained silent at all.
Id. at 408.
204. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
205. 447 U.S. at 247 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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been admissible for impeachment purposes because his silence was
ambiguous; it was not clearly inconsistent with the self-defense
story he presented at trial. "Since we cannot assume that in the
absence of official warnings individuals are ignorant of or oblivious
to their constitutional rights, we must recognize that petitioner
may have acted in reliance on the constitutional guarantee."2 ' In-
deed, in Jenkins's case, Justice Marshall thought that Jenkins
quite likely was aware of his rights because he had two prior felony
convictions and thus had received Miranda warnings at least twice
before.20 7 Justice Marshall concluded that because Jenkins could
have been relying on his right to remain silent when he failed to
come forward before his arrest, his silence was not inconsistent
with his trial testimony, and allowing the prosecutor to impeach
him with that silence therefore would be fundamentally unfair and
a violation of due process.208
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with impeachment
of a defendant's trial testimony by his prior silence is Fletcher v.
Weir.2 °9 In Weir, the defendant was involved in a fight with an-
other man who was stabbed during the fight and later died as a
result of the wounds. The defendant left the scene and did not
report the incident to the police. At trial, the defendant testified
that he had stabbed the victim in self-defense.2 10 During cross-ex-
amination, the prosecutor questioned him about his failure to tell
his self-defense story to the police at the time of his arrest. Critical
to the Supreme Court's analysis was the fact that "the record [did]
not indicate that [defendant] Weir received any Miranda warnings
during the period in which he remained silent immediately after
his arrest. '211 Under the Doyle analysis, the Court found no consti-
tutional problem with the cross-examination in Weir. "In the ab-
sence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Mi-
randa warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of
206. Id. at 247.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 249-50.
209. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 603.
211. Id. at 605.
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law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence
when a defendant chooses to take the stand.
212
The Court recently applied the restricted Doyle analysis to a
case decided after Weir involving the insanity defense. In Wain-
wright v. Greenfield,215 the defendant was arrested for sexual bat-
tery. Police officers read him the Miranda warnings three times,
and each time the defendant stated that he wanted to speak with
an attorney before making a statement. The defendant subse-
quently pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. At trial, the state
in its case in chief brought out the defendant's assertion of his
right to remain silent during questioning by the police. 4 The
prosecutor, in the closing argument, "suggested that [the defend-
ant's] repeated refusals to answer questions without first consult-
ing an attorney demonstrated a degree of comprehension that was
inconsistent with his claim of insanity. '215
212. Id. at 607. In other contexts, the Court has made clear that some governmental as-
surance is required before the fundamental fairness analysis may come into play. In Roberts
v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980), the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple drug offenses
but refused to divulge the names of his suppliers to government investigators. The trial
judge imposed consecutive sentences for each count and explained to the defendant that the
sentences were justified by several factors, including the defendant's refusal to cooperate
with the government. See id. at 555 & n.3. The defendant contended before the Supreme
Court that his refusal to cooperate was an exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination
and that the district court had "punished" him for exercising this privilege. Id. at 559. The
Court disagreed, stating that the defendant's conduct in this case "bears no resemblance to
the 'insolubly ambiguous' postarrest silence that may be induced by the assurances con-
tained in Miranda warnings." Id. at 561 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976)).
In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), the defendant asserted at his trial on
charges of driving while intoxicated that the admission of his refusal to take a blood- alcohol
test violated due process principles set forth in Doyle because the arresting officer failed to
inform him that his refusal could be used against him in court. The Court concluded that,
unlike the Miranda warnings in Doyle, "It]he warnings challenged here ... contained no
such misleading implicit assurances as to the relative consequences of his choice" because
the officer did warn the defendant that he could lose his driving privileges for a year if he
refused to submit to the test. Id. at 565. The Court concluded that this warning "made it
clear that refusing the test was not a 'safe harbor,' free of adverse consequences." Id. at 566.
213. 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
214. The arresting officer and a detective, testifying for the prosecution, "described the
occasions on which [the defendant] had exercised his right to remain silent and had ex-
pressed a desire to consult counsel before answering any questions." Id. at 636.
215. Id. Florida law requires that if the defendant's evidence "raise[s] a reasonable doubt
about his sanity," the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
sane. Id. at 636 & n.1. The state argued that because insanity was similar to an affirmative
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The Court concluded that the due process analysis in Doyle also
applied in Greenfield.
It is equally unfair to breach that promise [implicit in the Mi-
randa warnings] by using silence to overcome a defendant's plea
of insanity. In both situations, the state gives warnings to pro-
tect constitutional rights and implicitly promises that any exer-
cise of those rights will not be .penalized. In both situations, the
State then seeks to make use of the defendant's exercise of those
rights in obtaining his conviction. The implicit promise, the
breach, and the consequent penalty are identical in both
situations.2 16
The Court found that "silence" in this context "does not mean
only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain si-
lent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has
been consulted. '217 The fundamental fairness analysis thus turns
on the presence of some act by the government that implicitly as-
sures the defendant that his silence will not be used against him.218
In the context of the Doyle facts, the reading of the Miranda
warnings constituted the implicit assurance.
The "implicit assurance" analysis used in Doyle and limited in
Jenkins and Weir presents several problems. First, such an ap-
proach would allow the state in some cases to benefit from the mis-
conduct of its officers or employees. Consider a case in which the
police should have informed the defendant of his Miranda warn-
ings-which are required before police subject a suspect to custo-
defense, the state's use of the defendant's silence should have been treated as impeaching
that defense. The Court did not express an opinion on that argument. Id. at 639.
216. Id. at 639.
217. Id. at 641 n.13. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in the
result. He wrote separately to distinguish that part of the questioning and prosecutorial
comment that he thought was constitutionally permissible from the part that was unconsti-
tutional. Justice Rehnquist stated that "a request for a lawyer may be highly relevant where
the plea is based on insanity." Id. at 642. He then concluded that the testimony and com-
ment on the defendant's request for an attorney were not unfair under Doyle because the
request was a statement, not silence, and the police advised him that anything he said could
be used against him in court. Id.
218. Although the Court in Doyle also focused on the lack of probative value of the de-
fendant's post-arrest silence, see supra text accompanying note 195, the Court recently has
noted that "Doyle's probativeness rationale is secondary to its implied assurance rationale."
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634, 640 n.12 (1986).
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dial interrogation 219-but did not read the warnings. That defend-
ant's silence could be used to impeach his exculpatory trial
testimony220 because, as Weir made clear, the Doyle analysis is
triggered only by the reading of Miranda warnings.22' Thus, the
application of the Doyle approach in such a situation will result in
perhaps even greater unfairness to the defendant than the unfair-
ness found by the Court in Doyle. In this situation, the govern-
ment, whose agents-the police officers-violated the law by not
reading the Miranda warnings at the appropriate time, derives
from that violation a benefit: the ability to use the defendant's si-
lence to impeach his exculpatory trial testimony.22 That evidence
219. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 440 (1984) (Miranda warnings were not
required where defendant was questioned during a routine traffic stop because such a deten-
tion was "temporary and brief" and "comparatively nonthreatening"); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) ("the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' ") (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1124, 1125
(1983) (citation omitted)); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (Miranda warn-
ings required when the situation at issue involved "coercion [like that] inherent in custodial
interrogation"). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6 (1984).
220. See Stone, supra note 101, at 145-46.
221. See supra text accompanying note 212.
222. One commentator has argued that the result of Weir will be to "encourage[] police to
delay the administration of warnings to create silence for later impeachment use." Case
Comment, Use of Post-Arrest, Pre-Warning Silence is Permissible to Impeach Defendant's
Exculpatory Trial Testimony, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 861, 876 (1983). If true, this would suggest
that an exclusionary rule approach should be used to exclude evidence of silence, even for
impeachment purposes, whenever the police fail to read Miranda warnings at the appropri-
ate time. In fact, however, improper police conduct likely would not be deterred by an ex-
clusionary rule approach. If the police officers confronting a suspect think he is going to
speak, they will have a strong incentive to read the Miranda warnings to ensure that the
suspect's statement will be admissible at trial. If they expect the suspect to remain silent,
they will be inclined to withhold the reading of the warnings so that the suspect's silence
will be admissible as impeachment evidence should the suspect decide to testify. But at the
time they confront a suspect, police officers have no way of knowing whether he will speak
or remain silent; thus, they will have no incentive to violate Miranda. See Weir v. Fletcher,
658 F.2d 1126, 1136 (6th Cir. 1981) (Engel, J., dissenting) (if the police "deliberately with-
hold Miranda warnings so as to preserve the opportunity to use silence for impeachment
purposes ... it may be at the risk of a good opportunity to get a valid confession"), rev'd,
455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). But see Case Comment, supra, at 876 n.81 ("Given the
many ways in which arrest alone may induce silence, however .... the likelihood of a confes-
sion is not very great"). Further, even if police officers attempt to analyze the situation in an
effort to predict whether the suspect will make a statement, "their well laid plans ... will be
frustrated if the accused never takes the stand." Weir, 658 F.2d at 1136 (Engel, J., dissent-
ing). Finally, Professor Stone recognized that, "[g]iven the Court's treatment of the deter-
rence issue in Harris ... such an argument seems likely to fail." Stone, supra note 101, at
IMPEACHMENT USE OF SILENCE
would, of course, have been inadmissible under Doyle if the police
had read the warnings. As the New York Court of Appeals recog-
nized in Conyers, "[iut would appear rather anomalous to 'reward'
improper police practices by allowing the existence of such impro-
priety to serve as the justification for admitting evidence otherwise
inadmissible. '223
An additional problem raised by the Doyle-Jenkins-Weir analy-
sis concerns the appropriate procedure for determining whether
the prosecutor may use the defendant's pre-trial silence to im-
peach his testimony at trial. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides for discovery by a defendant of
any relevant written or recorded statements made by the de-
fendant,... within the possession, custody or control of the gov-
ernment .... [and] the substance of any oral statement which
the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by
the defendant, whether before or after arrest in response to in-
terrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a
government agent.2 4
Many states have similar provisions permitting the defendant ac-
cess to his prior statements made to police officers or other state
agents.2 5 In United States v. Holmes,226 a government agent ques-
tioned the defendant about whether he knew persons who were
later indicted as co-defendants. He answered, "No. 221 7 The govern-
ment did not reveal the defendant's "no" when it responded to the
defendant's discovery request for his prior statements. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that
146. The Court in Harris reasoned that sufficient deterrence would result from excluding a
statement taken in violation of Miranda from the government's case-in-chief. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
223. People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 179, 400 N.E.2d 342, 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 406,
vacated, 449 U.S. 809 (1980).
224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
225. Most states have a discovery provision that permits the defendant to discover his
prior recorded statements. See 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 219, § 19.3, at 485.
Some state courts have construed that provision to cover written descriptions of a defend-
ant's oral statements. See id. § 19.3, at 487. In addition, "[a]bout half of the states... also
require disclosure of the substance of certain oral statements of defendant known to the
prosecution." Id.
226. 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
227. Id. at 272.
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this failure did not violate rule 16 because the court construed the
request for "statements" to mean "written statements or confes-
sions, or oral statements which were transcribed, verbatim or in
substance by a Government employee" and stated that "the word
'no' in answer to a Government agent's question at the time of [the
defendant's] arrest [does not] fall[] into either of those catego-
ries. ' 22s The court, citing rule 16, concluded that the government
therefore had "no writing which [it] was required to disclose. 2 29
Because the Court's decisions in Jenkins and Weir, which held
the defendant's silence admissible for use as a prior inconsistent
statement, are relatively recent developments, thus far no cases
have arisen involving a claim by a defendant that his request to
discover prior statements under rule 16 should require the prose-
cutor to include descriptions of the defendant's silence. If actual
words spoken by the defendant do not always constitute a "state-
ment" under rule 16, then courts may not look favorably on the
argument that silence in a Jenkins or Weir situation is a statement
for discovery purposes.
Such a result, however, is contrary to the notions of fairness un-
derlying Doyle.230 This becomes clear when the choices faced by a
defendant who makes a verbal or written statement are compared
with those faced by a defendant who exercised his right to remain
silent. When a defendant who spoke to the police at the time of
arrest learns through discovery that he made a statement that the
prosecutor might use at trial, he may move to suppress the state-
ment on the ground that it was taken in violation of Miranda. A
defendant in that situation is entitled to a hearing outside the
presence of the jury to decide the admissibility of the statement.2 '
"Ordinarily, if the motion to suppress is made before trial, the ad-
missibility issue will be decided [even] before the jury is se-
lected. ' 23 2 If the trial court decides that the statement was taken
in violation of Miranda but is admissible for impeachment pur-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
231. C.f. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483-84 & n.9 (1972) (requiring such a hearing on
the issue of the voluntariness of the statement); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380, 391
n.19 (1964) (same).
232. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 219, § 10.5, at 802.
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poses under Harris v. New York,233 then the defendant may "take
into account the [statement], which may be brought out on cross-
examination, 23 4 in deciding whether to take the stand.
Current interpretation of rule 16, as exemplified by Holmes,
does not permit the silent defendant to know before trial whether
his pre-trial silence will be admissible for impeachment pur-
poses.235 Unlike the defendant who speaks, then, the silent defend-
ant must decide whether to take the stand without knowing what
the prosecutor may use to impeach his testimony. The Court has
stated that "[i]t is not thought overly harsh in such situations to
require that the determination whether to [testify] . . . take into
account the matters which may be brought out on cross-examina-
tion. 2 8 This suggests that, although a defendant may be required
to make hard choices, he should not have to do so without the in-
formation necessary to make an intelligent, informed decision.
Moreover, fairness dictates that a similar procedure be afforded
defendants who remain silent because the defendant's pre-trial si-
lence in a case like Weir is treated as the equivalent of a (prior
inconsistent) statement.237 For example, in future cases like Weir,
in which the record does not show whether the defendant received
Miranda warnings, the fact that the defendant remained silent
should be included in the prosecutor's response to a discovery re-
quest from defense counsel for all the defendant's prior "state-
ments" in the government's possession. The defendant might want
to move to suppress the evidence of silence (which would be used
as a prior inconsistent statement) on the ground that he received
Miranda warnings and therefore his silence is not admissible, even
for impeachment purposes, under Doyle.2 38
The next issue raised, then, is which party in that situation will
bear the burden of proof? If the prosecutor wants the defendant's
pre-trial statements admitted into evidence, the burden is on the
233. 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 116-18, 125-26.
234. Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) (decided with McGautha v. California),
vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
235. See United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1016 (1972).
236. Crampton, 402 U.S. at 215.
237. See Saltzburg, supra note 41, at 204.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
prosecutor to establish compliance with Miranda.239 This alloca-
tion of the burden of proof makes sense because it places the bur-
den on the party who seeks to admit the contested evidence and
who has the best access to the relevant information-for example,
an arrest record indicating when the warnings were read and by
whom.
240
In United States v. Cummiskey,241 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit considered which party should have
the burden of proving whether Miranda warnings were given in a
case like Weir. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause it is the prose-
cutor who is attempting to establish the relevancy, for impeach-
ment . . ., of post-arrest silence, the government bears the burden
of introducing evidence sufficient" to prove the absence of Mi-
randa warnings.4 2 One problem with placing the burden on the
prosecutor in such a case is that he is then faced with the difficult
task of proving the negative, that the warnings were not given. In
addition, allocating the burden in this way will, in some cases, re-
sult in the anomaly that police officers will be asked to testify that
they acted improperly in falling to read the warnings at the appro-
priate time. 43
Another flaw in making the Doyle fundamental fairness analysis
turn on the reading of the Miranda warnings is that such an ap-
proach presumably leaves open the possibility that the warnings
could be amended to advise the suspect "that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, '244 and that if he does not say anything, his silence
can be used against him. Justice White, in his concurring opinion
in Hale, noted that the defendant "was not informed here that his
silence, as well as his words, could be used against him. 2 45 One
commentator suggested that "the police could, consonant with the
239. See Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522-23 (1986); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (1966); 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 219, § 10.3, at 793.
240. See 1 W. LAFAV & J. ISRAEL, supra note 219, § 10.3, at 789.
241. 728 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
242. Id. at 205.
243. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
244. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
245. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 183 (1975) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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privilege, warn a suspect that his silence may be used to impeach
his testimony at trial" and that such a "'silence warning' might
make use of postarrest silence 'fair.' -1246 Professor Kamisar has
pointed out some of the problems with that "solution:"
[S]uch a revision might only aggravate existing problems. Can a
police officer be trusted to explain to a suspect how he can have
'a right to remain silent' and still have his silence used against
him at trial? And even if an officer does his very best to explain,
can the average suspect be expected to understand? 247
An additional concern with the fundamental fairness approach
to impeachment by silence is that the Court has construed the im-
plicit assurance too narrowly. In Jenkins v. Anderson,24 8 the Court
held that cross-examination of a defendant about his pre-arrest si-
lence was not inconsistent with due process principles because "no
governmental action induced [the defendant] to remain silent
before... [he] was taken into custody and given Miranda warn-
ings. '249 And in Fletcher v. Weir,80 the Court held that "[iln the
absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Mi-
randa warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of
246. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 86 (1980). Accord Poulin, supra note 41, at 215 n.160
("Once the specific problem of Doyle . . . is removed by informing a defendant that his
silence can be used against him, then the way seems open for the use of each 'response' of
silence"). Schaefer, supra note 151, at 520-21 ("any suspect.., should be advised ... that
he need not answer [and] he should also be advised that if he is subsequently charged, his
failure to answer will be disclosed at his trial").
247. Y. KAMISAR, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later -
Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 92
n.12 (1980) (reprinting an article by the same title that originally appeared in 73 MICH. L.
REV. 15 (1974)). Professor Kamisar went on to observe that
[t]he available empirical data indicate that a large number of police officers do
not give the silence or counsel warnings at all, and many who do, do not give
them in a meaningful way; moreover, a significant percentage of suspects either
misunderstand the existing warnings or fail to appreciate their significance....
In this light, how can anyone seriously suggest that we make the Miranda
warnings significantly more complicated, yet continue to rely on the uncorrob-
orated oral testimony of the police officer to establish the legality of the
questioning?
Id. (citations omitted).
248. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
249. Id. at 240.
250. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
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law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence
when a defendant chooses to take the stand. ' 251 According to the
Court, then, the government "induces" a defendant to remain si-
lent only when an officer actually reads the Miranda warnings to
the defendant.
Connecticut v. Leecan252 illustrates how the Court's narrow in-
terpretation operates. In that case, the defendant contended that
cross-examination concerning his post-arrest silence violated the
due process clause, although, as in Weir, the record did not show
when or whether the Miranda warnings were read to the defend-
ant.2 53 The defendant argued that the state court should have
taken "judicial notice of the probability that at some point be-
tween his arrest and his trial he would have been advised of his
constitutional right to remain silent. ' 254 The Connecticut Supreme
Court stated that "the defendant in this case testified that he had
disclosed nothing to the police, not because of any official warning
received at arraignment or at any other time, but because his at-
torney advised him to remain silent."2 55 The court concluded that
"neither the police nor any other government personnel can rea-
sonably be deemed to have induced the defendant's postarrest si-
lence, as is essential to support a claimed violation of Doyle. ' '256
In neither Jenkins nor Weir did the Court accurately focus on
exactly what induced the defendant in Doyle to remain silent after
his arrest. The Court incorrectly assumed in Jenkins and Weir
that the reading of the Miranda warnings by a government official
constitutes inducement.257 In fact, what induces any defendant to
remain silent under those circumstances is not the reading of the
warnings, but their substance. Thus, if a defendant is aware of his
right to remain silent and chooses not to speak in reliance on that
right, he has been "induced" to remain silent by the existence of
the right. Under Doyle, he can, of course, be impeached if he re-
ceived no warnings even if he was already aware of his rights.
251. Id. at 607.
252. 198 Conn. 517, 504 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2922 (1986).
253. Id. at 531, 504 A.2d at 488.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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II. AN EXTENSION OF THE DOYLE DUE PROCESS THEORY
Under the theory proposed in this Article, the reading of the Mi-
randa warnings is irrelevant to the admissibility of the defendant's
pre-trial silence. The Court in Doyle held that the impeachment
use of the defendant's post-arrest silence was "fundamentally un-
fair and a deprivation of due process" because it violated the as-
surance that the Court found to be implicit in the language of the
Miranda warnings.258 If, as this Article asserts,259 defendants who
choose to remain silent do so in reliance on the existence of the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, rather than
on the words contained in the Miranda warnings, then the "fair-
ness" of allowing the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's trial
testimony with the fact of his prior silence does not depend on
whether the warnings were read. According to this theory, the due
process clause prohibits any use of a defendant's pre-trial silence
because to use such silence against a defendant violates the assur-
ance implicit in the privilege against self-incrimination "that si-
lence will carry no penalty.
26 0
A. Doctrinal Basis for the Doyle Due Process Rationale
The "implicit assurance" or fundamental fairness rationale of
Doyle finds support in two cases cited by the Court in a foot-
note.261 In Johnson v. United States, 26 2 the defendant was charged
with not reporting income he allegedly obtained as "protection"
from persons engaged in illegal gambling.2 3 At one point during
cross-examination by the prosecutor, the defendant asserted his
privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecutor, in his closing
argument to the jury, contended that the defendant's assertion of
the privilege cast serious doubt on his credibility.26 4
258. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
259. See infra text accompanying notes 274-81.
260. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
261. Id. at 618 n.9 (citing Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Raley v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 423 (1959)).
262. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
263. Id. at 190.
264. The prosecutor stated: "Now, ladies and gentlemen, can you believe that man told
you the truth about anything on the witness stand when he admits that he got numbers
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Regarding the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's claim of
privilege, the Court in Johnson stated:
[W]here the claim of privilege is asserted and unqualifiedly
granted, the requirements of fair trial may preclude any com-
ment .... If the privilege claimed by the witness be allowed, the
matter is at. an end. The claim of privilege and its allowance is
properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no
inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them from the
legal assertion by the witness of his constitutional right. The al-
lowance of the privilege would be a mockery of justice, if either
party is to be affected injuriously by it.265
Otherwise, the Court noted, the defendant could have been misled.
When the privilege was granted by the trial court, the defendant
expected that his assertion of the privilege would carry no penalty.
The Court stated that "[a]n accused having the assurance of the
court that his claim of privilege would be granted might well be
entrapped if his assertion of the privilege could then be used
against him. His real choice might then be quite different from his
apparent one. '266 The Court held that when a court permitted a
defendant to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, the
prosecutor could not suggest that the jury draw an adverse infer-
ence from the defendant's silence.267 Without discussing the consti-
tutionality of using a defendant's assertion of the privilege against
him, the Court concluded: "That procedure has such potentialities
of oppressive use that we will not sanction its use in the federal
courts over which we have supervisory powers. "268
In Raley v. Ohio, 9 the defendants were called to testify before a
commission of the Ohio legislature investigating allegedly subver-
sive groups. The commission chairman advised three defendants
money in 1938 but won't tell you who he got it from on the ground it would incriminate
him?" Id.
265. Id. at 196-97 (quoting Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853)). The Court
noted that the same rule would have applied even if the trial court had incorrectly granted
the privilege. Id. at 197.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 196.
268. Id. at 199. Ultimately, the Court in Johnson found that the defendant had waived
any objection to the prosecutor's comment on his assertion of the privilege by withdrawing
his exception to it. Id. at 200.
269. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
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during questioning that they could refuse to answer questions if
doing so might tend to incriminate them. The defendants, who as-
serted the privilege in response to questions, were subsequently
tried and convicted for contempt based on their refusal to answer
questions put to them by the commission. The Supreme Court re-
versed their convictions under the due process clause.17 0 The Court
held that to affirm the convictions "after the Commission had ac-
ted as it did would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of
entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to
him.,,)271
In both Johnson and Raley, officials speaking on behalf of the
government had told the defendants that they could assert their
privilege against self-incrimination. They relied on the assurances
by the officials and refused to speak. The Court in both cases con-
cluded that a defendant could not, consistent with principles of
due process, be penalized for asserting the privilege after being in-
duced to do so by the government.272
B. Doctrinal Basis for the Extension of the Due Process Theory
Closer examination of the reasoning in Doyle reveals that, in
fact, the implicit assurance to which the Court referred is con-
tained in the substance of the Miranda warnings. The Court in
Miranda required that the suspect be advised, prior to custodial
270. Id. at 437. The Court affirmed, by an equally divided vote, the conviction of the only
defendant whose assertion of the privilege had been denied and who had been directed by
the commission to answer certain questions. Four of the justices believed that no entrap-
ment existed as to this defendant. Id. at 443-44 (separate opinion of Clark, J.).
271. Id. at 438.
272. The Court reaffirmed the Raley analysis in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). In
Cox, the leader of a civil rights group planning to demonstrate in front of the local court-
house was given permission by the police chief to march on one side of the street. The
demonstration occurred at the location specified by the police chief. The Court, in reversing
the leader's conviction for disturbing the peace, obstructing justice, and picketing near a
state building, stated:
The situation presented here is analogous to that in Raley .... [A]fter the
public officials acted as they did, to sustain appellant's later conviction for
demonstrating where they told him he could "would be to sanction an indefen-
sible sort of entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the State had clearly [sic] told him was available to him."
Id. at 571 (quoting Raley, 360 U.S. at 426).
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interrogation, "that he has the right to remain silent [and] that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law. '2 73
That a police officer reads those words to a suspect does not add to
or detract from the assurance that the Court believed was implicit
in them. In Roberts v. United States,274 the Court stated that "the
right to silence described in those [Miranda] warnings derives
from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it. ' 275 In other
words, that language in the Miranda warnings is simply a restate-
ment of the rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment. The privi-
lege against self-incrimination is what gives any person the right to
choose to say nothing. Therefore, the implicit assurance "that si-
lence will carry no penalty 276 arises from the fifth amendment it-
self. Justice Marshall was correct in his dissent in Jenkins when he
stated that, "properly considered, the use in Doyle of postarrest
silence for impeachment purposes was fundamentally unfair not
because it broke an implied promise by a single narcotics agent,
but because it broke a promise made by the United States
Constitution. 2 7
7
Consider the case of the knowledgeable defendant. Assume that
the police arrest a lawyer who is suspected of having committed
some crime. The police question her at the station, but fail to read
her the Miranda warnings. She is, of course, aware of her right
under the fifth amendment to remain silent, and in reliance on
that right, she says nothing. Isn't using that silence to impeach her
trial testimony just as "fundamentally unfair" as the Court in
Doyle found the impeachment of the defendant's exculpatory testi-
mony with his post-warning silence to be? Yet the Court has never
asserted that the fairness of the impeachment use of pre-trial si-
lence turns on the knowledge of the particular defendant. Indeed,
273. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
274. 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
275. Id. at 560. Accord Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 n.1 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The furnishing of the Miranda warnings does not create the right to remain
silent; that right is conferred by the Constitution").
276. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
277. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 248 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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in Miranda the Court explicitly rejected an inquiry into whether,
in particular cases, the defendant was aware of his rights."'
As the Connecticut Supreme Court noted, in a case decided after
Doyle but before Weir, "[o]ne need not be advised of a right in
order to exercise it. ' ' 27 Even Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that
"[a]t this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar
with the concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads:
'No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.' ",280 Indeed, the Court in Miranda recog-
nized that many suspects will know their rights; it nevertheless re-
quired that the warnings be read to every suspect, to inform "those
unaware of the privilege," to "overcom[e] the inherent pressures of
the interrogation atmosphere" and to "show the [suspect] that his
interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he
choose to exercise it."'281 Because the assurance that silence will not
be used against a defendant is implicit in the privilege against self-
incrimination, using silence against a defendant who already knows
his rights would be as unfair as the Court found the use of Doyle's
silence against him.
Even if the defendant was silent for reasons other than reliance
on the privilege against self-incrimination, the due process analysis
would still mandate exclusion of the silence at trial because deter-
mining accurately whether pre-trial silence of a defendant was mo-
tivated by the privilege, by fear, or by an intent to fabricate an
exculpatory story later is impossible.282 The defendant can, of
course, testify as to the reason for his prior silence. Justice Stevens
278. 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court stated that "[a]ssessments of the knowledge the de-
fendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior con-
tract with authorities, can never be more than speculation." Id.
279. State v. Cook, 174 Conn. 73, 77, 381 A.2d 563, 565 (1977) cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2922 (1986). The court in that case held the defendant's pre-trial silence inadmissible even
though "the record... [did] not disclose at what point the Miranda warnings were given to
the defendant if at all." Id.
280. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). Ac-
cord United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1976) ("it is clear that many ar-
rested persons know, without benefit of warnings, that silence is usually golden"); Saltzburg,
supra note 41, at 203 n.372 ("With the exposure of the public to Miranda warnings on
television and in movies, it may be that people now have a general familiarity with the right
to remain silent").
281. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
282. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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proposed such an approach in his dissenting opinion in Doyle. s3
But the majority in Doyle rejected this, stating that "the unfair-
ness [that violates due process principles] occurs when the prose-
cution, in the presence of the jury, is allowed to undertake im-
peachment on the basis of what may be the exercise of that right
[to remain silent]."284 Similarly, under the proposed theory, requir-
ing the defendant who did not receive warnings to explain his pre-
trial silence would violate due process principles. As the Court
found in Doyle, the "unfairness occurs" when the defendant is
asked to testify about the reason for silence that may be the exer-
cise of the privilege against self-incrimination.
In this regard, this Article's analysis and the theory of the Doyle
majority share a negative feature: both analyses will protect some
defendants who remain silent not in reliance on their constitu-
tional rights but because they are guilty and need time to concoct
a defense. s Even when they have just been advised of their rights
as required by Miranda, some defendants will say nothing, again
not in reliance on their rights, but because they need time to de-
vise an alibi. According to the Supreme Court, however, "'[t]he
privilege against self-incrimination serves as a protection to the in-
nocent as well as to the guilty.' "28
Application of the proposed theory would result in reversal of
the convictions in Raffel and Weir. In Raffel, defendant's silence at
his first trial was obviously an exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination. Requiring the defendant to explain his silence as an
exercise of the privilege or as reliance on the advice of counsel is
precisely the sort of penalty that concerned the Court in Hale2817
283. Justice Stevens stated:
If the defendant is a truthful witness, and if his silence is the consequence of
the Miranda warning, he may explain that fact when he is on the stand. Even
if he is untruthful, the availability of that explanation puts him in a better
position than if he had received no warning.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 626 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 619 n.10. (emphasis added).
285. That was the inference that the prosecutor in Doyle presumably wanted the jury to
draw. See id. at 619 n.10.
286. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956) (quoting Maffie v. United States,
209 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1954)).
287. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975) ("permitting the defendant to
explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative inference that
the jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent").
[Vol. 29:285
IMPEACHMENT USE OF SILENCE
and Doyle.88 Indeed, the Court in Doyle stated that "the error we
perceive lies in the cross-examination on this question, thereby im-
plying an inconsistency that the jury might construe as evidence of
guilt. 289
In Weir, the defendant was silent at the time of his arrest. In
that situation, the defendant was not obviously exercising his right
to remain silent. As the Court stated in Hale, "He may have main-
tained silence out of fear or unwillingness to incriminate another
• . . [or he] may simply [have] react[ed] with silence in response to
the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his de-
tention. ' 2 0 It is impossible to tell. Nevertheless, "the unfairness
[prohibited by due process principles] occurs when the prosecu-
tion, in the presence of the jury, is allowed to undertake impeach-
ment on the basis of what may be the exercise "of a constitutional
right. I29
Likewise, the analysis based on due process would compel rever-
sal of the conviction in Jenkins. That the defendant in Jenkins
had not yet been arrested 292 is irrelevant under this theory. "At
every stage of the investigative or accusatory process a person
must decide what, if anything, to say to the government. '293 The
right to remain silent exists even before arrest because the privi-
lege against self-incrimination forbids the government from requir-
ing someone to give testimony against himself at any time. The
defendant in Jenkins may have known of his rights prior to his
arrest and prior to receiving Miranda warnings.294 The implicit as-
surance in the privilege was present under the facts of Jenkins just
as it was present in Doyle. Allowing the prosecutor in Jenkins to
use the defendant's pre-arrest silence to impeach his trial testi-
mony was, therefore, "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of
due process. "295
288. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.10.
289. Id.
290. Hale, 422 U.S. at 177.
291. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.10 (emphasis added).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
293. Saltzburg, supra note 41, at 204.
294. As noted previously, Justice Marshall thought this was likely because the defendant
had two prior felony convictions and therefore had certainly received Miranda warnings at
least twice before. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 247 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
295. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
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The proposed due process theory has the same persuasive appeal
as the theory that suggests that a prosecutor should not be permit-
ted to impeach a defendant with his prior silence because that
would penalize him for exercising the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation or, more accurately, for exercising his right to testify.29 6 It
differs from that theory because according to the proposed theory,
the fifth amendment itself does not prohibit the impeachment use
of silence; such use of a defendant's silence violates the due process
clause because it would be "fundamentally unfair" to breach the
promise, implicit in the privilege, that if one chooses to exercise his
right to remain silent, that right will not be used against him.
Using the due process clause rather than the privilege against
self-incrimination to determine the admissibility of a defendant's
pre-trial silence is consistent with history, policy, and precedent.
First, there is an obvious difference in the wording of the two
clauses. The privilege is phrased in relatively narrower, more spe-
cific terms, whereas "the due process clauses are in very general
terms. '29 7 The American notion of due process of law grew out of a
provision of the Magna Carta: per legem terrae.298 As Professor
Pennock noted, "It was intended to guarantee-at least to the bar-
ons-the common-law rights of Englishmen. . . [and] [t]he barons
were demanding justice . . , "29 Although neither the commenta-
tors nor the Supreme Court has developed a comprehensive and
precise definition of the concept of due process, most commenta-
tors and the Court have considered the idea of fairness to be domi-
nant. As Dean Griswold stated, "it is the fundamental and proce-
296. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
297. Griswold, Due Process Problems Today in the United States, in THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 167 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970). Accord Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319, 320 (1957) ("it is in the
nature of this constitutional provision that all-embracing definitions are impossible);
Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1049 (1968)
(characterizing the due process clauses as "[p]erhaps the most ambiguous statement in the
Constitution"); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 111 (1978).
298. See Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradi-
tion, in NoMos XVIII: DUE PROcEss 4 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) [hereinafter
Nomos XVIII]; Pennock, Introduction, in NoMos XVIII, supra, at xv. Ratner, supra note
297, at 1049.
299. Pennock, supra note 298, at XV.
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dural fairness that is the essence of due process. ' 300 Justice
Frankfurter agreed: "Fairness of procedure is 'due process in the
primary sense.' ,,301 Prohibiting impeachment use of a defendant's
pre-trial silence under the privilege against self-incrimination
would create tension with its history and policies, but doing so
under the due process clause is consistent with its history and
policies.
Reconsider the dilemma described by Justice Marshall in his
dissent in Jenkins3 0 2 and quoted at the beginning of this Articles 3
facing a person who may have violated the law. Initially he must
decide whether to go to the police. If he talks, his statements may
be used against him if he is brought to trial. If he remains silent,
his silence may be used to impeach him, according to the majority
in Jenkins. The due process theory advocated here eliminates this
dilemma by requiring an absolute prohibition on the use of a de-
fendant's pre-trial silence against him.
In addition, such a prohibition based on the fundamental fair-
ness principle of the due process clause removes the anomaly that
exists under current case law and permits the prosecution in some
cases to benefit by the misconduct of police officers.3 04 The defend-
ant will not be penalized by the failure of the arresting officer to
read the Miranda warnings because the defendant's silence will be
inadmissible whether or not the warnings were read. Further, this
theory renders unnecessary a suppression hearing at which the
prosecution would have to prove that no Miranda warnings were
read to the defendant, even if that omission violated Miranda."5
300. Griswold, supra note 297, at 169 (emphasis added). Accord Pennock, supra note 298,
at xix ("a central concept of due process [is] fairness"); Saphire, supra note 297, at 114
("Due process has often been proclaimed to represent a constitutional concept of fairness").
301. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Accord Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 495 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) ("the concept of fairness [is] implicit in due process"); Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 424 (1945))
("Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause 'inescapably imposes upon this
Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings ... in order to
ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the no-
tions of justice of English-speaking people . .. ' ").
302. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 253-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
303. See supra text accompanying note 10.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 219-23.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34, 237-43.
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Finally, and most importantly, the proposed theory alleviates
the unfairness that can occur under the current Supreme Court
view when the prosecutor is permitted to impeach a defendant
with prior silence that was in fact an exercise of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Principles of due process require no
less.
